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oland’s six-month chairmanship of the EU came to an end in December 2011. 
Politically, it was a very volatile period, with the Greek and Libyan crises that 
significantly altered the European foreign policy agenda and complicated Poland’s 
initial intention to refresh the EU Eastern policy. 
At the start of its term, there was a niche for Polish activity in the post-Soviet area, taking 
into account the ‘Eastern fatigue’ in Europe and the scaling down of the United States’ 
commitment to Eastern Europe and the Caucasus as a result of the Moscow-Washington 
‘reset’. When Alexander Rahr, one of the key German experts in post-Soviet affairs, claimed 
in August 2011 that Poland in its capacity as the EU presiding country should become more 
actively engaged in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, he most likely expressed the 
dominant expectations among Germany’s political class. The logic of this ‘Go East!’ discourse 
was quite obvious: due to emergency situations in North Africa and Greece, Germany would 
not be able in the immediate future to streamline the EU’s Ostpolitik and would be happy to 
pass on this task to Poland, taking into account Warsaw’s co-authorship of the Eastern 
Partnership programme (EaP). Besides, Berlin is always hesitant to deeply engage with 
Russia’s neighbours to avoid irritating Moscow and further alienating it from Europe. 
Yet the reactions to these expectations from the very beginning were quite cautious.  Some 
German analysts (for example, Stefan Meister from DGAP1) argued for a stronger emphasis 
on the German-Polish co-management of the Eastern policy, using existing institutional tools 
such as the Weimar triangle. Warsaw made clear that too elevated expectations of its role 
might be misplaced, especially in the Caucasus where Poland did not want to engage with 
the frozen conflicts, leaving the initiative to Germany and France. Thus, Nicolas Sarkozy’s 
visit to Baku and Erevan immediately after the Warsaw EaP summit in the beginning of 
October 2011 demonstrated France’s own intentions in this conflict-ridden region.  
 
                                                      
1 Stefan Meister, “A new start for Russian-EU Security Policy: The Weimar Triangle, Russia and the 
EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood”, Genshagener Papiere, No. 7, DGAP Analyse Kompakt, Berlin, July 
2011. 
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The EU’s concerns 
In fact, what the EaP produced during the Polish EU Presidency was the final declaration of 
the Warsaw summit, which acknowledged the European aspirations of the EaP countries 
and the principle of conditionality known as ‘more for more’. The funding of the programme 
remains scarce. Yet the key structural problem with the content of the EaP is the proper 
balance between its political and technical sides. In the recent study by the Slovak Foreign 
Policy Association, the EaP was criticised for “unclear political leadership” and “missing 
political guidelines”. This is indeed a crucial issue.  
The EaP was from its very inception a political project aimed at supporting fragile 
democracies in Eastern Europe after the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008. This explains 
the rhetoric of the Warsaw summit that claimed that “the Eastern Partnership is based on a 
community of values and principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. All countries participating in the Eastern 
Partnership are committed to these values through the relevant international instruments”.2 
There are two main problems with this evidently politicised approach. First, it looks so far a 
bit like wishful thinking: the concept of ‘deep democracy’ appears to be premature and hasty 
in times when even elementary democratic norms do not seem to be the evident guidelines 
for many ruling elites in EaP capitals. Second, the initial political design of the EaP is not 
substantiated by the political commitment on the part of Brussels to the core issue of the 
membership perspectives.   
It is this lack of political commitment that Brussels is eager to compensate for by the 
technical offers to the EaP countries. Most of the EaP instruments (visa liberalisation, deep 
and comprehensive free trade) are technical by their nature, they are about implementing 
norms of the acquis communautaire in border management, phytosanitary control, etc. In this 
sense, the EaP may indeed be dubbed a modernisation project,3 focusing on tackling the 
issues of mismanagement, corruption, the shadow economy, lack of transparency and 
accountability, clan economy, etc. Within this logic, democracy can’t be a pre-condition for 
membership in EaP, since none of its countries corresponds to the EU democracy standards. 
Against the backdrop of the prevailing managerial logic within the EaP, it becomes 
understandable why the EU is hesitant to intervene in a  series of violence-prone over-
politicised situations in those EaP countries facing the challenges of clashing identities, 
contested borders, complex interplay of inclusion and exclusion, etc. (Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Transdniestria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia).   
The EaP as seen from Europe’s ‘near abroad’ 
In almost all six countries covered by the EaP, this programme faces implicit or explicit 
criticism, basically for the lack of incentives and prospects for membership. There are at least 
three issues that fuel sceptical attitudes from the EaP countries. The first is of a perceptional 
nature: while the EaP governments (except Belarus) view this initiative as a kind of common 
interface with the EU, for Brussels it is only an institutional platform for the EU’s own 
policies towards the six neighbours.  
The second issue stems from the first one: since the EaP is an EU tool designed for its own 
needs and convenience, it will inevitably be part of a broader system of the EU’s external 
policies. On the one hand, both Brussels and Berlin have to implicitly adjust the tempo and 
                                                      
2 http://www.easternpartnership.org/community/debate/eap-after-summit 
3 Alexander Duleba and Vladimír Bilčík, “Taking Stock of the Eastern Partnership: Preliminary 
findings and discussion points”, Research Centre of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, supported 
by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the International Visegrad Fund, October 2011. EASTERN PARTNERSHIP: STILL A MISSING LINK IN EU STRATEGY? | 3 
 
the depth of the EaP to make it commensurate with the EU’s relations with Russia, which 
include the negotiations on a visa-free regime, the Meseberg initiative,4 etc. On the other 
hand, Brussels has to accommodate the preferences of other EU member states that are not 
willing to pursue a ‘Russia-first’ policy. To be viewed in the framework of the EU-Russian 
relations seems to be inacceptable for countries located between these two powers and 
perceiving themselves as important elements of the pan-European order. Under these 
circumstances, manoeuvring between different poles becomes the core strategy of most EaP 
countries, of which Ukraine is perhaps the best example. Since both Moscow and Brussels 
have their own reasons (pragmatic and normative, correspondingly) to take critical stances 
towards the official Kiev, President Yanukovich hopes to reduce the criticism from the 
outside, using Moscow’s aversion to the ‘orange government’ and Brussels’ policy (mostly 
lobbied by Warsaw) to present Ukraine as the leading country in the EaP. 
Thirdly, bilateral relations between the EU and each of the six ‘eastern partners’ evidently 
prevail over the common EaP agenda. The reasons for this are much deeper than simple 
failures in EU policies: the differentiation and fragmentation within the post-Soviet space are 
so profound that none of major world actors (including the EU, NATO or Russia) is in a 
position to contrive a common framework to incorporate most of them. This explains why 
the EU prefers to tackle the most urgent issues on a country-specific basis, rather than 
approaching its partners as a group. 
The cases of Ukraine and Belarus are especially illustrative in this regard. There are voices in 
the EU that call for giving priority to those countries that show particular eagerness to 
closely interact with the EU, and Ukraine is certainly one of them. This country is critically 
important for the EU due to its ability to help relinquish exactly what Russia is eager to 
maintain – the old-style spheres of political influence. On 15 December 2011, Ukraine became 
the first EaP country to officially finalise a lengthy set of negotiations on a political 
association agreement with the EU, which to a significant extent was a counter-reaction to 
Russian economic and political pressure. Nevertheless Kiev was warned by Brussels that the 
agreement’s ratification from the EU side is politically conditioned on the reversal of the 
Timoshenko verdict. This pressure, in our view, can bring results, since Kiev itself admits 
that, in the light of recent Russian-German energy projects that bypass Ukrainian territory, 
the country faces the prospect of marginalisation in Europe and a diminished ability to gain 
dividends from its geopolitical position between the EU and Russia.  
A political rationale is also evident in the case of Belarus which demonstrates, in our view, 
the maximum that the EU may afford in sanctioning its neighbours. In the meantime, thanks 
to the coordinating role of Poland, Belarus was proposed a ‘modernisation package’, but 
only in exchange for political reforms and release of all political prisoners. This example is 
illustrative of the EU logic of politically engaging the country in a partnership through 
technical means. 
Russia: A ‘non-neighbour’ but a partner 
Russia, which earlier voluntarily refused to participate in the European Neighbourhood 
Policy and thus claimed its status ‘above’ the ordinary EU neighbours, does not seem to care 
much about the EaP and is eager to develop its own integrationist project. Only a few days 
                                                      
4 The June 2010 Meseberg Memorandum, signed by Chancellor Angela Merkel with President Dmitry 
Medvedev at Merkel’s initiative, envisages creating an EU-Russia Political and Security Committee. 
This could potentially give Russia a voice in the EU’s decision-making processes. To facilitate this, 
Berlin is asking Moscow to demonstrate its bona fides as a partner to the EU by facilitating a 
resolution of the Transnistria conflict. 4 | MAKARYCHEV & DEVIATKOV 
 
after having announced his decision to run for president in the March 2012 election, Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin published an article in “Izvestia” that looks like a concise 
enunciation of his foreign policy priorities for the next years in office. In it Putin calls the 
Customs Union a nucleus for post-Soviet reintegration, and makes clear that the Kremlin will 
heavily invest in this project, which in this case is doomed to present an institutional 
challenge to the EaP. The Russian initiatives on the Customs Union and Eurasian Union are 
more a resource for increasing the status of Russian leadership internally and externally than 
a well-thought out economic strategy. Such pompous moves reflect the character of the 
Kremlin regimes, which typically need great missions and success stories, even those 
existing only on paper. 
Yet the reality on the ground looks much more difficult. Russia clearly lacks resources (both 
material and soft power) to play the role of the dominating party in the post-Soviet region. 
The ruling elite in the Kremlin is too technocratic and pragmatic for lavishly disbursing 
money to the neighbouring countries (as many of them certainly expect) without the promise 
of immediate payback; besides, the negative memories of the Soviet Union which sponsored 
its allies until the complete disintegration of the system are still alive. What is more, in spite 
of Putin’s rhetoric, integrating the post-Soviet area does not look like the real essence of 
Russian economic policies: due to its heavy dependence on the export of energy, in practice 
it seeks to foster cooperative projects with the EU and China. Most experts have quite bluntly 
assessed the ceremonial opening of the Nord Stream pipeline by Dmitry Medvedev and 
Angela Merkel in November 2011 as conducive to a further weakening of Ukraine – which 
Moscow deems one of potential members of the Customs Union – in international energy 
markets.   
A ‘dead calm’ or a respite? 
It would be fair to describe the Eastern Partnership as an experimental EU project that, as 
demonstrated by other similar initiatives previously launched by the EU (Northern 
Dimension and the Barcelona Process), will most likely undergo serious institutional 
transmutation. What is more or less clear by now is the growing disparity within the group 
of six counties: Belarus is institutionally bracketed out from the project; the Timoshenko trial 
in Kyiv has alienated Ukraine from Europe; Moldova can’t overcome its lengthy political 
deadlock provoked by deep divisions within the ruling elite; Georgia is desperately trying to 
maintain its higher profile as a pioneer in the good governance reforms; Azerbaijan is 
making efforts to promote itself as the most reliable partner in energy sphere, while Armenia 
has to pass the democracy test with the forthcoming elections in 2012.   
 Against this background, Warsaw faces new challenges. On the one hand, one of its key 
foreign policy priorities remains in the East, since Polish expertise in dealing with former 
Soviet countries is exactly what increases Poland’s role and weight within the EU. Yet on the 
other hand, Warsaw could not neglect other events, including the effects of the ‘Arab spring’ 
for the entire West, as well as the deepening crisis in the eurozone. Under these 
circumstances, in its Eastern policy, Warsaw is eager to rely more strongly on the 
institutional resources of the Polish-German nexus, including the ‘Weimar group’ (Germany, 
France and Poland) and the German-Polish-Russian ‘triangle’ with its summit held in 
Kaliningrad in summer 2011. 
Thus, by the end of 2011, all major actors were neither willing nor capable of making radical 
moves. The reasons for this relative passivity and inaction are different (Germany is trying to 
rescue the eurozone, Russia will be preoccupied until the next spring with a more 
complicated than anticipated presidential election, Ukraine is not rushing to raise its status in 
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combination of ‘business as usual’ and ‘wait and see’ approaches that appear to suit most of 
the actors. Yet within this status quo approach, there is some room for pro-active policies. 
Putin’s projects for the Customs Union and Eurasian Union mean the intention to push 
Ukraine out of the status quo (which in practice boils down to free trade with both parties). 
Russia shows its readiness to alter the status quo in Transdniestria, but it seems that its 
political and diplomatic resources are insufficient for exerting effective influence on the local 
elites in Tiraspol, despite their almost total economic dependence from Moscow. This means 
that even if Russia is ready for political changes, it may not be able to implement them. As 
seen from the EU prospect, Russia’s weakness may bring different policy effects: in the case 
of Transdniestria it can seriously damage the prospects of the Meseberg initiative and 
ultimately impede Russian-German relations, while in South Ossetia Moscow’s failure to 
promote its candidate in the presidential election in fall 2011 makes the domestic situation in 
this breakaway territory more pluralistic and thus susceptible to EU influence(s). 
And within Russia itself, with the mass-scale protest movement that erupted in the aftermath 
of the December 4 Duma election, the Kremlin appears to become politically much weaker 
and less credible than could have been imagined some months ago, which will undoubtedly 
add more vigour to the EU policies of democratising Russia. With more grassroots demand 
for good governance, transparency, accountability and democracy, the Kremlin’s allying 
with either dictators or authoritarian leaders like Lukashenko, Karimov and others, will be 
increasingly challenged from within, which makes changes in Russia’s neighbourhood 
policies a likely part of a new political agenda. 